Abdullah Öcalan
The Road Map
to
Democratization of Turkey
and
Solution to the Kurdish Question
– Summary –

Published by the
International Initiative “Freedom for Abdullah Öcalan – Peace in Kurdistan”
2011

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About this text

The document in front of you is an extraordinary one.

Addressed to the European Court for Human Rights, one of the Council of Europe’s most important organs, the »Road Map« is part of Abdullah Öcalan’s written defence in one of his pending cases. The Turkish authorities confiscated it illegally in August 2009 and did not hand it over to the Court for eighteen months. The Court got hands of it only after repeated insistence that the Turkish authorities have no right to withhold documents from the Court or even read them.

But read it they did undoubtedly. After carefully examining Öcalan’s proposals the Turkish state decided to start high-level talks with Abdullah Öcalan. These talks were confirmed by the government in August 2010. The claim that the »Road Map« was the document that set off the talks does not seem exaggerated.

It is therefore a key document in the struggle for a peaceful and democratic solution for the fundamental problems of Turkey: its lack of democracy and the Kurdish question. The »Road Map« addresses all of these problems in a comprehensive manner. We have summarized some key points of its analyses and proposals to foster a better understanding of the Kurdish perspective on the solution of the conflicts and challenges.

We are confident that the publication of this text will contribute to a better understanding of the ongoing process. We hope that on the basis of this road map it will evolve into a negotiation process that will finally lead to democratization of Turkey and a solution to the Kurdish question.

International Initiative
“Freedom for Abdullah Öcalan – Peace in Kurdistan”
April 2011
The Road Map to Democratization of Turkey and Solution to the Kurdish Question

Foreword

This evaluation comes at a time when discussions on democratization in Turkey have intensified and because of the responsibilities that I hold. The year 2009 has become of utmost importance in the solution of the Kurdish question which is at the heart of these intensified discussions. The President, Mr Abdullah Gül has denoted this importance by saying that “It shall be resolved, there is no other way”. Furthermore, this presentation gained more importance due to the elucidative manner with which the fundamental institutions concerned with state security have acted in relation to the resolution of problems, evaluations made about me in the public domain and the appeals made.

Moreover, the written and verbal wishes of the then President Turgut Özal at the beginning of the 1990s and of the then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in 1997, the briefing notes sent from the Army Social Relations Department around about the same period, the discussions held with certain authorities during and after the ten days of interrogation in the aftermath of my arrest in 1999, as well as the letters I have sent to various competent authorities and the tendency of the Republic of Turkey becoming a bit more clear were all amongst the factors that had an influence on such a presentation.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework and its Principles

Conceptual Framework

In Turkey, not that long ago, problems would come to a deadlock even at the conceptual level due to the prohibitions placed on defining any problem. Many concepts such as the concept of being a “Kurd” as well as many other concepts of the left wing literature had previously been prohibited. There is still a fear of the notion of “Kurdistan” and a reluctance to use it amongst the official circles. I shall not talk about the scientific development of the notion of Kurdistan. Instead it is sufficient to say that it originated from the attributes of the local people there and much evidence can be presented to show that it was used by the Seljuk and Ottoman administration to mean “land of the Kurds”. At the time of establishing the republic Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself used the terms of “deputy of Kurdistan”, “assembly of Kurdistan” and “province of Kurdistan” very often. The prohibition of concepts such as Kurds and Kurdistan during the period of denial and assimilation can not possibly eradicate their validity. Just as we proceed to resolve the issues a prohibition placed on the usage of Kurds and Kurdistan shall, from the word go, lead us to a deadlock. Any usage outside of this can be rejected by the concerned party.

There are concepts that must be defined clearly and the first and foremost of them is democratization itself. Democratization is one of the most distorted concepts in Turkey. The meaning of democratization I employ in my evaluation is not class-based. It embraces all the social contexts. It does not bear the mark of any class or stratum. It denotes the safeguarding of freedom of expression and association as well as individual rights of all the social sections—whether a minority or majority or indeed whichever language, religion, ethnicity and nationality they may be—against the state. It is not right to either suspend the state within democracy or democracy within the
state. They both have a different role and function. One of the most vital issues of democratization is the ability of state and democracy to counterbalance one another.

The two other items that are important and need to be clarified as we proceed to a solution are “republic” and “nation-state”. Not all republics are nation-states. The Roman Republic is an example of this. The concept of republic is related to democracy and denotes the representative administration by the social sectors including the members of the public without being hooked on to the oligarchic monopolies. Nation-state, on the other hand bases itself on the analogy drawn between state and nation, as was seen in the most obvious examples of fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Japan. It refuses to acknowledge the existence of different interest groups within a nation together with their rights and freedoms. It does not allow the groups within a state and nation to have different and contradictory interests. It is essentially a dictatorship. The formal democratic covers can not change this attribute of its. Therefore, as we proceed towards a solution in Turkey it is highly important that the concepts of republic and nation-state are defined and understood correctly. For instance, the Kurdish question can be resolved within a republic but it cannot be resolved within a nation-state that amounts to being the negation of a republic.

Clarification of concepts such as “common homeland” and “nation” are also of utmost importance. It is quite possible that peoples from different cultures may accept the same geography as common homeland and this is what we often encounter in history. For example areas that are presently in general called Turkey and Kurdistan were used to be called Anatolia and Mesopotamia before and are the common homeland of many peoples such as Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, Arabs, Jews, Christians, Greeks and many groups of Caucasian origins. It is neither fair nor realistic to make it the homeland of Turks and Kurds alone. Just because the state borders of the Republic of Turkey encompasses these areas it does not mean that these areas belong solely to the Turkish ethnicity.

A similar definition can be advanced for the concept of a “common nation”. A nation is not composed of each and every single citizen; in addition and more importantly nation should be seen as the sum of peoples where the citizens belong to or it should even be understood as the nation of nations. If there is a consensus on the concept of “common homeland” then the common nation of all the peoples and nations who live within the borders of the same state and all those who are included in this concept are the nation of that state. It would be more of an analytical concept and serve democratization more to name those who live in Turkey the Nation of Turkey just as we say Republic of Turkey and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

The clarification of the concept of “identity” would contribute to the solution. Identity defines feeling of belonging of the communities with respect to attributes such as religious, national, cultural, gender and its like. But the important issue here is whether our approach to identities are open and flexible or strict and firm. Being open and flexible makes a tremendous contribution to democratic solutions. Strictness and firmness on the other hand makes the solution more difficult than it is. It is possible to view cross-breeding of identities as a prosperity. What is important is to understand how different and conflicting the approach between a synthesis and the dissolution of one identity in another is.

The most important aspect in relation to conceptual questions is not to fetishize the concepts; and not to present any given social phenomenon as the exaggerated chauvinistic value of a narrow
concept. For instance, the insistence on some varying and abstract categories such as nation, country, religion and language to be the fundamental dogmatic values is incompatible with the spirit of democratic solutions.

**Theoretical Framework**

The clarification of the theoretical framework in relation to democratization will contribute to the solution. The utmost fundamental issue is to clearly differentiate between the theory of nation-state and democratic nation. The nation-state bases itself on the homogeneity of citizens with a single language and single ethnicity. In addition it conditions this very citizen to carry out the same rituals by binding it to the same official belief. The mentioned belief is not patriotism but chauvinistic nationalism and religionism. The nation-state does not approve of social differences. It bases itself on each group being identical to the other. It is clear that this corresponds to a nation theory which is in accordance with fascist ideology. Democratic nation theory is quite different. Its definition of a state is multilingual, multi-religious, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and composed of groups and individuals with different interests. It does not base itself on the sameness of citizens and groups. It does not accept the definition that “state equals nation”. It holds that they are both different formations. State and democracy are two different areas that need to be elaborated on. The important thing is that both of these areas become a separate entity in an equilibrium where they recognize each other’s legitimacy. This should be made the most fundamental provision of the constitution. The theory of democratic nation considers groups, religious communities and civil society as important as the citizen and constitutionally secures their existence. The concept of abstract citizens is nothing but a liberal babbling. The citizen can only gain a concrete meaning by belonging to a group, community or civil society.

The other important theoretical question is in relation to the constitution. The question whether it is “state or individual” that underlies the theory of the constitution is a much debated issue. There is a huge difference between the constitutional theory seen as the sum of rules that regulate the state and the constitutional theories that regulate the individual’s rights and freedoms before the state. The same is true for collective rights and freedoms. It is clear hence that the theory of democratization must base itself upon the constitutional theory that predicates on the protection of individual and collective rights and freedoms before the state. The state, which is the most organized power, does not need protection. Its existence is already the expression of such a protection. Tying its operation down to fundamental rules is not in contrast with the theory of democratic constitution.

The other important distinction to be thoroughly understood is the distinction between statist and democratic solutions of social issues. The statist theory regards the nationalization of all things to be the solution of all social issues. For example even religion—which is related to metaphysical philosophy and belief—is made a state property, turning it into a problem instead of a solution. Many of the economical, social, cultural and national problems are presumed to be resolved once they are a property of the state or are controlled by the state. Clearly this theory can not resolve problems but multiplies and aggravates them.

Another drawback of the statist theory is that it steers the forces affected by the problem to statism as well. Thereby it risks that they impose their own nation-state as the only solution. In a
way this leads to the mentality that one can only be against the state with a state. The superior analytic opportunity given by democratic theory is that it does not see it necessary and mandatory to break away from the state boundaries or to have a tendency to form a counter nation-state. The big bonus of democratic theories is their proposition of a flexible solution that is not state, that does not target to be a state and it does not reject nor deny the state.

A further fundamental theoretical question is in relation to the theory of individual and collective rights. There is a tremendous amount of speculation on this issue. This is an issue distorted by liberal individualism. Even a minimal understanding of social sciences would show us that what is individual is also social and what is social is also individual and that one bears the other within itself.

As we develop the theoretical framework for the resolution of democratization issues we need to understand that one of the most important problems have emerged from the European and especially France based positivist social scientism. Despite the fact that France is in its Fifth Republic it still experiences problems in relation to secularism, citizenship and religious communities. It also lost all its hegemonic claims not only against the British Empire, but in all of Europe and the world. Positivist social scientism is the decisive factor in all this. The Republic of Turkey, the previous Tanzimat\(^1\) and both of the Meşrutiyet\(^2\) periods had based themselves upon France’s Third Republic. Moreover they had embraced French positivism as it was the ideology of modernity at the time. Therefore it is quite important to examine and clarify the role this had played and its results. Frankly, if in the past ninety years the Republic of Turkey has not moved towards democratizing itself, then in the absence of clarifying the practical impact of the French positivism’s theoretical and republican practices the probability of developing a successful solution looks dim and old problems shall persist. I am not talking about a total rejection of the impact of French positivism and its republican practices. But if we are not able to overcome its negative effects and benefit from the scientific revolution and developments in the theory of democracy that came after the 1950s, then the opportunity for grand democratization and freedom of thought shall not be put to the best use.

The French influence on theory and praxis is still of importance and requires analysis. Presently, Euro-centric social sciences draw much criticism in general. The mask of orientalism in relation to the Middle East is gradually pulled down. In short here is what I am saying: We can not totally ignore Middle East’s proven leading cultural values of 15,000 years and certainly not the dominant cultural values of the central civilizations of the last 5,000 years. What we can also not ignore is the opportunities for a solution in them. We do not think that we can resolve or understand our fundamental social problems through this five hundred year old culture that is vulgar materialist and positivist, not to mention that most of it has been taken from the Middle Eastern culture. The solutions attained on the basis of this culture may lead us to structures that are more unsound. What is right however is to break loose from the Euro-centric ideological hegemony and to put the tremendous human values and approaches to resolving social problems present in the Middle Eastern and Far Eastern traditions back on the agenda.

\(^1\) Reform period in the Ottoman Empire, 1838-1876
\(^2\) Constitutional periods in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1878 and 1908-1922
An additional issue that needs to be considered in terms of the theoretical context is the relationship between “historicity” and “now” that is the present. Objective dogmatism that was inspired from positivism shows its impact mostly on the meaning between history and now. It either considers now to be a strict deterministic quantitative accumulation of history or considers history to be a quantitative accumulation of now going back in time. Indeed it does not see a difference between history and now. Therefore history is being rejected. To claim that “now is history” constitutes a terrible web of errors and mistakes. Besides, the positivist construction of now is built upon around ninety percent denial of the truth. Its impact on history leads either to a tremendous denial or its counterpart, exaggeration.

It is more appropriate to determine how history conditions now through a thorough research. No social problem can be treated and solved in the absence of its historical connection or by turning it upside-down. We can not talk about a now that does not reflect its history.

A final contribution to the theoretical framework should be sought from the religious and moral oriented thinking and practices. The option of democratization taken solely within the framework of political theory would neither be fair nor reconcilable with one’s conscience. The society is not a political reality alone, it is also a moral and religious reality. For thousands of years both religion and morals were institutions that focused the most on the problems of the societies they belonged to and developed solutions.

**Framework of Principles**

The framework of principles must be developed on the basis of the theoretical framework. The democratic solution to be developed must go beyond being just topical and in accordance with the current political situation. It must be structural for it to be permanent. The resolution of the problems should contribute to the recovery of the system or if there is none it should contribute to its re-construction but it should not just salvage the day. A functional state and a lasting social stability necessitates such solutions. Since democracy is a system of state and society, the steps of democratization need to be systematic accordingly. I believe that the principles I am about to list, and which can further be extended, can ensure the minimum conditions required to establish a permanent framework of achieving a democratic system.

**1- Democratic Nation Principle:** This denotes the nation form of a democratic society that is not based on any single language, ethnicity, class or state but is multilingual, multi-ethnic and does not leave room for class distinction or state privileges. It is based on free and equal individuals. Such a democratic nation consists of democratic citizens, communities and is built upon a flexible nation paradigm of open cultural identities.

**2- Common (Democratic) Homeland Principle:** It denotes the sum of homelands that are freely and equally shared and where no individual or community is othered by any individual or community.

**3- Democratic Republic Principle:** It denotes the democratic society’s and individual’s accessibility to the state. The organization of the state and the democratic organization of the individual are two different phenomena that are based on respecting each others legitimacy.
4- Democratic Constitution Principle: This is the constitution composed through a social consensus based on protecting the democratic citizen and communities against the nation-state.

5- Inseparability of the Individual and Collective Rights Principle: Individual and collective rights are two different aspects of the same society just as although the society is made up of individuals it is still different to the sum of individuals. This is quite similar to a medallion not having a single side. There can hence not be any society or individual that have either the individual rights or the collective rights alone.

6- Ideological Independence and Freedom Principle: The democratic nation solution can not be achieved if the positivist ideological hegemony of capitalist modernity and its liberal slavery reconstructed as individualism are not overcome. Self-consciousness about its own social nature is the consciousness condition for a democratic nation solution.

7- The Principle of Historicity and Now: Social realities are historical realities. The realities that were experienced in the past continue to exist at present and within the current developments with very little difference. If the link between history and now is not determined correctly then the individualism of the capitalist modernity that has been stripped off its history and the homogeneous, instantaneous and temporary social mentality can not be overcome. The correct understanding of history and the present is a necessary condition for the democratic nation solution.

8- Morality and Conscience Principle: To attain a sound solution to any given social problem there is a need to resort to morality and conscience. The solutions of modernity that solely rest on power and law do not yield results but suppress and distort the problems. Empathy based on morality and conscience is essential within the democratic nation solution.

9- The Self-Defence Principle of Democracies: There are no living beings without self-defence. Democratic societies are the most advanced beings of nature and they can not materialize and sustain their existence without self-defence. In democratic nation solutions, the requirements of the self-defence principle must be met.

Action Plan for a Solution

If any of the proposed resolution models to social problems do not have a corresponding practical value then it will only amount to brainstorming. Undoubtedly practical steps are also related to thinking, they are thoughts on foot. Nevertheless the response to a successful analysis can only be given through its practice.

I can say on my own behalf that I found taking practical steps in the resolution of the Kurdish question, albeit amateurish, more important then unilateral actions. I believe priority should always be given to meaningful dialogues. But I also know that self deception in the name of dialogue brings disaster. One should not belittle the negotiation capacity of the parties. The slightest ground for negotiations is more precious then the most advanced and successful physical action taken.

There was a very strict denial policy being enforced when it came to the Kurds during the 1970s when the PKK emerged. Even oral opposition to this policy was met with the most severe punishments. Even back then priority was given to joint democratic solutions together with the left wing
groups. This was the aim of me being elected to the Presidency of ADYÖD (Ankara Democratic Association of Advanced Education) in 1975. When this did not work it was inevitable to focus on the emergence of PKK. Turning to the initiative of 15 August 1984 was yet again the only alternative against the policy of denial and annihilation. Although it was not as I had envisaged it, I did not hesitate to do the best I could.

If the dialogue initiated in the early 1990s by the then President Turgut Özal would have been further developed the Kurdish question would be at a totally different stage today. The state did not give its own president the opportunity to engage in dialogue and negotiations. The traditional policy of denial and annihilation was in total operation. We were passing through one of the darkest periods of the republic’s history. The dialogue attempt of the political and military fronts in 1997 and 1998 suffered the same fate. The internal and external obstructions, in short the GLADIO which was influential over all the political and military structures did not allow for even the simplest attempts of dialogue and negotiation. Despite all my efforts to treat the Imrali interrogation procedures as the grounds for dialogue and negotiations someone continuously spoiled it. All my proposals were left unanswered. It was clear that they were planning to totally eliminate the movement. There were structures that saw negotiations and dialogue as their own termination. These had grown strong and had become state within a state. They were the most dangerous and merciless of all the sections that had the infectious disease of the desire for power. Despite all my warnings, there was death by the thousands and innumerable material loss. Personally, I chose to limit the warfare since the 1990s. But when this did not attain any results I had to reveal as a last warning that, although undesirable, a total resistance by Kurds and Kurdistan was inevitably near if they were to “protect their existence and attain their freedom”. I am mentioning the possible grounds for dialogue and negotiations because developments of this kind are also not impossible.

It is not as if there are no plans amongst the parties to the war. Action plans constitute an area that is insisted and worked on a lot. I know the existence of such work quite well from my own experiences. Unilateral action plans are implemented passionately. But what is difficult is to develop action plans that shall bring the parties together. In the absence of mutual empathy such plans can not be advanced. I will now try to briefly present my views on the unilaterally developed and currently implemented action plans and then on a possible action plan that will lead to the reconciliation of the parties. I must say that I do not see myself as one of the responsible parties in the implementation of the plan. This is because the present status of conviction and the conditions under which it is enforced do not allow me to become a party. The opinion I present here aims to ensure that the parties get to know each other realistically and that it be informative about a possible joint action plan in terms of what is acceptable and what is not.

1- The Solution Plan of Traditional Policy of Denial and Annihilation: Although not as much as before there are still plans developed and implemented to attain such a solution. These are circles that came into existence as middle-class bourgeoisie and bureaucracy resting upon the wealth attained from the state. They have been exposed and isolated both internally and externally yet they do not hesitate to enforce their annihilation plans through insidious and brutal methods. The response of all the Kurds, apart from the traditional Kurdish collaborationist sections, against the implementation of this plan is to stage the most comprehensive resistance of their history.
PKK, who is in the leadership position of the resistance, has the capacity and the power to comprehensively implement its own action plans. It is in a position to make transitions from passive defence plan to active defence and to all-out resistance plans. In the period ahead it maybe expected that it makes the transition to the all-out defence plan because there will be serious bottlenecks to be experienced in the democratic solution.

2- The Federalist and Nationalist Solution Plan: These plans too are being implemented in different areas and dimensions. It is the traditional colonial nation-states and global hegemonic powers who are behind these plans that are being implemented by the Iraqi Kurdistan Federal Administration. Although they each have a different aim there is a general consensus. They support this plan because they wish to distort the revolutionary and democratic potential of the Kurds. The USA is the hegemonic power that most openly supports the Kurdish Federal Administration. This Federal Administration plays a strategic role in controlling Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. The Turkish, Iranian and Syrian administrations have been supporting the “Small Kurdistan” plan through various plans since the Second World War in the North of Iraq in order to break down the resistance of their own Kurds and to rule out their own Kurdistans. When the Kurds wish to overcome the role designated to them these forces raise their objections all at once.

Politics and plans based on divide and rule are being mostly executed by the “Small Kurdistan” project. The revolutionaries, radical democrats and socialists are counteracted through this manner. A fundamental target of the plan is the isolation of PKK. There is a comprehensive Gladio operation to isolate and eliminate the PKK in return for a “Small Kurdistan”. Furthermore this plan gets a wide spread support from the field of international diplomacy. The US, Turkish and Iraqi administrations, who have now included the Kurdish Federal Administration amongst them, are for now in accordance with this plan and trying to lure the PKK away from the armed struggle. But this plan is not sufficiently executed due to the differing interests of the parties whereby its implementation remains limited. It holds no hope because it is not widely supported by the Kurdish society and because it only serves the interest of a narrow elite sector. It is hence exposed and isolated ever more each day.

The response of PKK to this plan is not to surrender and continue to resist. Many people who were undecided, morally and ideologically weak for a long time in our ranks ran away and took refuge with the holders of such a plan. Although the holders of such a plan wished to create a new collaborationist movement it did not take long before they were exposed. Kurdish nationalism is traditionally quite weak. This therefore does not allow it to develop a consistent nation-state plan. It has, so to speak, become their fate to become corrupt and then be eliminated. They have pinned all their hopes to the breakdown of PKK’s resistance. Turkish governments too had vested all their hopes in much the same way for a long time. They had hoped for help from the Kurdish nationalism based on “Small Kurdistan”. They tried to implement a plan similar to the one implemented against the Greeks and Armenians to the Kurds on the basis of “Small Kurdistan”. However the difference in the conditions and the position of the PKK has left the plan counterproductive. As a backlash PKK’s line is becoming even stronger.

3- The Democratic Solution Plan: The fact that the first two plans above have not given much hope and have been very expensive at all fronts has turned the inclination of the Republic of Turkey towards democratization projects. Indeed contemporary developments also support such ad-
vancement. The urge by the US and EU (in terms of harmonization), the similar tendency shown by the media, civil society, the general public as well as all the Kurds increase the feasibility of the democratic solution plans for the very first time. Despite all the counter resistance of the nationalist-fascist front, which have become a minority, the fundamental institutions of the state too are not against the democratic solution projects. On the contrary they are taking on important roles to prepare the ground work. All these increase the chance to implement the solution plans. In the face of this new historical situation a feasible action plan between the parties needs to pass through a few stages. If a consensus is reached amongst the fundamental institutions of the state and the government over the main features of the Democratic Solution Plan and if the support of the Kurdish side together with the support of democratic forces are attained then the possible implementation and phases are as follows:

a- The First Phase: The PKK will declare a permanent no-action period. During this phase the parties should be careful not to be provoked, to have a tighter control over their own forces and continue to prepare the general public.

b- The Second Phase: A “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” should be established with the Government’s initiative and it should obtain the approval of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. This commission should prepare proposals that shall assist in the removal of legal obstacles. Maximal consent shall be sought between the parties in the composition of the commission. In connection with the confessions and defences presented to the commission, the commission shall propose an institution of amnesty to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In the case that legal obstacles are as such removed the PKK shall then be able to withdraw its extralegal structures outside the borders of Turkey under the supervision of a board consisting of authorities from the US, EU, UN, Iraqi Kurdish Federal Administration and Republic of Turkey. It shall in time be able to position its forces in different areas and countries. However the critical point at this stage is that the release of those detained and convicted for PKK activity and the withdrawal of PKK armed forces outside the borders are jointly planned. Here the principle of “neither shall be implemented without the other” shall apply.

c- The Third Phase: As constitutional and legal steps to democratization are taken there will be no grounds left to resort back to arms. The gradual return home of all those who have been in exile for many years, especially those who have taken office in the PKK, those who have lost their nationality and those who are refugees shall begin. As the activities of KCK shall attain legality there will be no need for PKK to have activities within the border of Turkey. It shall base itself on all aspects of legal and democratic political, social, economic and cultural activities.

My position is of strategic importance when it comes to implementing this three phased plan. This plan has a limited chance of implementation without Öcalan. Therefore reasonable solutions need to be developed in relation to my status.

I can thus present my draft thoughts and proposals in relation to a democratic solution and its plan as was expected of me by the general public in Turkey and the vast majority of the Kurds. It is clear that I shall be in a position to review, modify and improve my thoughts and proposals on the basis of thoughts and proposals made by the parties.
Now that I have prepared this draft report or road map undoubtedly most of the responsibility falls on the AKP government as well as the authorities from the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the fundamental institutions of the state. If a general consensus is reached then there will be a need to start straight off from the first phase. If not, and this is not a threat, then both the PKK and KCK shall be forced to make the transition into the phase called “all-out resistance to protect the existence of the Kurds and free them”. Therefore in order not to pave the way for this we need to prevent daily political interests and desires at any price and implement our model and plan of democratic opening and solution of the Kurdish problem.

In the case that “The Model for Democratic Opening and the Solution to the Kurdish Question”, which can be a response to the Turkey’s historical realities and present conditions, is implemented this shall not only mean a more independent development of Turkey but also shall mean a democratic, equal and free development path for the peoples of Middle East. The advancement of the elements of democratic modernity against the occupation and colonialism of the regional culture by the elements of capitalist modernity shall give democratic modernity the opportunity and strength to transform into a system that is in accordance with its own historicity. History shall perhaps for the first time escape from being written as the history of occupation, colonialism and all forms of invasions and begin to be written as the history of a society composed of the life of democratic, equal and free individuals.

Abdullah Öcalan
15 August 2009